

Revaluating the Role of Marwān b. Muḥammad in the Creation of Murvan Qru

In Georgian sources, Murvan Qru is considered the commander, responsible for the Arab occupation of the country.¹ The most important of these sources, Pseudo-Juansher (ca. 800), identifies Murvan Qru with Marwān b. Muḥammad, governor of the northern district of the Caliphate from 732/735 to 744.² It is common among scholars to regard Pseudo-Juansher's information about the conquest as a multitude of events, depicting various campaigns integrated as one.³ As a result, many scholars propose that Murvan Qru is a construction of various generals, active in the broader area of the Caucasus. The most prevailing opinion is that Murvan Qru is a compilation of Muḥammad b. Marwān and Marwān b. Muḥammad.⁴ Others suggest that he was inspired by Maslama b. Abd al-Malik, Abd al 'Aziz b. Hatim b. an-Nu'man al-Bahili or even just Muḥammad b. Marwān.⁵

Regardless of Murvan Qru's identity, researchers agree that Marwān b. Muḥammad's Georgian Campaign was the main source of inspiration behind the creation of Murvan Qru's story.⁶ They also argue that the former's campaign was the most decisive Arab military operation in Georgian territory to that date. As a result, every campaign preceding this was abbreviated and presented as sections of Marwān b. Muḥammad's operation in Pseudo-Juansher's text.

In this paper, we try re-examining the sources to reconsider the above-presented theses about Marwān b. Muḥammad's Georgian Campaign and its impact on Georgian

¹ Juansher Juansheriani, *The Life of Vakt'ang Gorgasali*, p. 111. Hereinafter: Pseudo-Juansher.

² Pseudo-Juansher, p. 111: "Murvan the Deaf approached Kartli. He was an Agarian amir and a son of Mohammed's tribe, who had been sent to Kartli by Eshim [Hisham] the al-mu'menin of Baghdad, who was son of Abdal-Melik of Baghdad of the same tribe". For his appointment in the Caucasus, see Khalifa b. Khayyāt, *Khalifa ibn Khayyat's History*, p. 230. Also see Blankinship, *The End of the Jihad State*, pp. 170-171.

³ E.g. Martin-Hisard, *La domination byzantine*, p. 152.

⁴ E.g., see Toumanoff, *Studies in Christian Caucasian History*, p. 351; Rapp, *Studies in Medieval Georgian Historiography*, pp. 384-385; Vacca, *Non-Muslim Provinces under Early Islam*, p. 153.

⁵ For the identification with Maslama b. Abd al-Malik, see სანაძე, ბერაძე, *VIII საუკუნის I ნახევრის ქართლისა და ეგრისის პოლიტიკური ისტორიიდან* [Sanadze, Beradze, *On the Political History of Kartli and Egrisi in the First Half of the 8th Century*], გვ. 70-81, with Abd al Aziz, see ჩიქოვანი, *ყრუ ბაღდადელის ვინაობის შესახებ* [Chikovani, *About The Deaf from Bagdadi*], გვ.132-137, and for Muhammad b. Marwān, see აბრამიშვილი, *სტეფანოზ მამფალის ფრესკული წარწერა* [Abramishvili, *Mural Inscription of Stepanoz Mampal*], გვ. 27-31.

⁶ See e.g., Bíró, *Marwan ibn Muhammad's Georgian Campaign*, pp. 295-296.

historiography. We propose that this campaign did not actually take place and instead is a fictitious creation of Georgian historiography, operating as a *medium* of propaganda in domestic affairs.

To begin with the critical examination of this operation, it is necessary to analyze the campaign in Pseudo-Juansher's text.¹ According to the historian, the campaign was destructive for both Kartli and Egrisi. When Murvan Qru entered Georgian lands, he demolished all the cities and fortresses in Kartli, while hunting the noblemen escaping in Egrisi.² There, he captured crucial administrative centers, such as Tsikhe-goji and Apsilian Tskhumi.³ His campaign ended in the fortress of Anakopia, where Kartvelians defeated the weakened by dysentery Arab forces. Finally, while returning to the Caliphate Murvan Qru's army was decimated, since his forces drowned because of the overflowing rivers of western Georgia.⁴ Chosroids Mihr and Archil are in the spotlight of this story since they are depicted as the leaders of the resistance against Murvan Qru.⁵ It must be noted that this text has been used by later narrative sources, regarding Murvan Qru's campaign.⁶

However, Arabic sources provide a different view of the Arab operations in the Caucasus during Marwān b. Muḥammad's governorship than the Georgian one. According to these sources, Marwān b. Muḥammad's campaigns targeted Khazars and the tribes in Dagestan and not Georgia. Both, Khalīfa b. Khayyāt and al-Ṭabarī date Marwān's first campaigns in the Caucasus at 735/117.⁷ These campaigns were a two-prong attack against three fortresses under Alan dominion and Tumanshah in the Eastern Caucasus.⁸ Next year, the Arab general operated against Wartanis in the Eastern Caucasus, while in 737/119 Marwān campaigned against the Khazars.⁹ Arab historians write that with this operation, Marwān b. Muḥammad managed to occupy Khazar cities

¹ For the writer and the dating of the text see Rapp, *Studies in Medieval Georgian Historiography*, pp. 197-242 and especially pp. 235-242.

² Pseudo-Juansher, p. 111.

³ Pseudo-Juansher, p. 111.

⁴ Pseudo-Juansher, pp. 111-112.

⁵ Pseudo-Juansher, pp. 111-112.

⁶ This Arab General is the adversary in the *Martyrdom of Saints David and Constantine*, an eleventh-century hagiographic text. According to this, the two brothers formed the first line of defence against Murvan Qru and were eventually executed, because they refused to accept Islam. According to Sanadze and Arakhamia, the original text was composed regarding events of the sixth century, which was proceeded and edited to simulate the political situation of the eighth century. For more details, see სანაძე, არახამია, VI ს. ისტორიული ქრონიკა [Sanadze, Arakhamia, *The VI Century Historic Chronicle*], გვ. 110-120. For its ideological implications, see Martin-Hisard, *Les Arabes en Géorgie occidentale*, pp. 113-119.

⁷ We should not that we will follow a double-dating system in the AD and Hijri years in the present study.

⁸ Khalīfa b. Khayyāt, *Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt's History*, pp. 233-234, al-Ṭabarī, *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, p. 111.

⁹ For 736/118, see Khalīfa b. Khayyāt, *Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt's History*, pp. 234-235.

such as Balanjar, Samandar, and al-Bayda while subjugating the Khagan.¹ After these events, he attacked the semi-autonomous tribes of Southeastern Caucasus, allies of the Khagan, targeting their subjugation.²

The comparative analysis of the sources leads us to reject at all that Marwān b. Muḥammad campaigned against Georgia during the years 735-740/117-122. This is highlighted by the cautious analysis of the following aspects: a) the area of the conflicts, b) the timing of the campaigns and c) the recognition of Arab authority in Georgia.

A) According to the Arabic sources, confronting the Khazars was Marwān b. Muḥammad's major operational target. Since the beginning of the 720s, the Caliphate tried to consolidate its presence in the broad area and especially in the passes to North Caucasus.³ At the time of Marwān b. Muḥammad, the Caliphate aimed to prevail against the Khaganate and establish peace along the Northern border.⁴ After causing a severe blow to the Khaganate, Arabs turned to the tribes in the eastern Caucasus to subjugate and then pacify the region. This prioritization is confirmed by numismatics. According to Schindel, numismatic evidence proves that the city-fortress of Derbent flourished during Marwān b. Muḥammad's governorship in the Umayyad North.⁵ This can relate to the city's strategic importance during Marwān's struggle against the Khazars. It is evident that Marwān b. Muḥammad focused on the regions of conflict with his interest limited to the eastern Caucasus and not Georgia. As a result, Murvan Qru's campaign could not occur during Marwān b. Muḥammad's excursions against the Khazars.

B) It is of grave importance to determine the campaign's time frame.⁶ As shown above, during 735-739/117-121 Marwān b. Muḥammad focused his efforts on the eastern Caucasus, a fact that proves that in this period he could not operate against Georgia. This led Tavadze to propose that the first Arab attacks against Georgia took place in 739/121 with an escalation in 740/122, after the campaigns in Dagestan.⁷ We must look closer to the duration of Marwān b. Muḥammad's campaigns in Dagestan. According

¹ Khalīfa b. Khayyāt, *Khalifa ibn Khayyat's History*, p. 235, Balādhūri, *The origins of the Islamic state*, pp. 325-327.

² For Marwān b. Muḥammad's campaign in Eastern Caucasus, especially in modern-day South Dagestan, see Khalīfa b. Khayyāt, *Khalifa ibn Khayyat's History*, pp. 239-240; al-Ṭabarī, *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, p. 167; Ya'qūbī, *The Works of Ibn Wāḍiḥ al-Ya'qūbī*, p. 1036; Семёнов, *Хронология и маршруты арабских походов*, стр. 78-90.

³ For an overview of the aims of Arab policy in the Caucasus in the 720s, see Blankinship, *The End of the Jihad State*, pp. 121-125.

⁴ For the mild success of these operations, see Blankinship, *The End of the Jihad State*, pp. 172-174.

⁵ Schindel, *Umayyad Copper Coinage*, p. 11.

⁶ E.g., Toumanoff dates it in 736, while Bíró proposes 737 as the correct date. See Toumanoff, *Studies in Christian Caucasian History*, p. 405 and Bíró, *Marwan ibn Muhammad's Georgian Campaign*, pp. 295-299, respectively.

⁷ თავაძე, *საქართველო VIII საუკუნეში* [Tavadze, *Georgia in the Eight Century*], გვ. 117-125.

to Khalīfa b. Khayyāt these campaigns took place in 739/121.¹ However, we should keep in mind that Khalīfa's description regards more than one military operation while it is evident that Marwān b. Muḥammad faced some difficulties in subjugating the tribes of the eastern Caucasus. These lead us to propose that the duration of the military operations against Dagestan spread more than one year. In support of this, Bal'amī's report of the one-year siege of the citadel that the lord of al-Sarir had withdrawn to is enough.² Even if this report is dismissed as Bal'amī's exaggeration, it is indicative of Marwān b. Muḥammad's struggle in these campaigns. Based on these, we support that the continuous preoccupation of the Arab armies in the aforementioned conflicts makes an excursion against Georgia impossible.

C) Studying the political dependency of Georgia with the Caliphate in the first half of the 8th century leads us towards the rejection of the campaign as a historical event. Even if we ignore the testimonies of the Arabic sources regarding the time and space of the Arab-Khazar hostilities, we cannot justify an Arab operation in Georgia during Marwān b. Muḥammad's governorship in the Umayyad North. The Arab dominion in Kartli began in 705/86 and was already consolidated before Marwān b. Muḥammad's campaigns against the Khazars.³ This can be supported by the entrance of Arab armies in Tbilisi in 728/110 and 730/112, since Khalīfa b. Khayyāt does not mention an attack against the city, implying that Arabs used it as a station before a Khazar campaign.⁴ Balādhūri also confirms this, since he writes that al-Jarrah b. Abdallah renewed the submission treaty with the people of Tbilisi, maybe in 730/112, adding a special clause

¹ Khalīfa b. Khayyāt, *Khalifa ibn Khayyat's History*, pp. 239-240.

² Bal'amī, *Chronique de Abou Djafar Mo'hammed*, pp. 290-291. Semenov also notices the extending of the campaigns after 739. See Семёнов, *Хронология и маршруты арабских походов*, стр. 82, 87. Also see Blankinship, *The End of the Jihad State*, p. 175, in which he states that Marwān b. Muḥammad's final campaigns against Dagestan can be dated to 740/122.

³ ფაღავა, *საქართველოში არაბთა ბატონობის პერიოდიზაცია* [Paghava, *Periodization of Arab Sway in Georgia*], გვ. 252-254; ფაღავა, *შუასაუკუნოვან საქართველოში* [Paghava, *In the Medieval Georgia*], გვ. 22-24.

⁴ Khalīfa b. Khayyāt, *Khalifa ibn Khayyat's History*, pp. 222 & 224, respectively.

regarding taxing issues.¹ This status quo in Tbilisi highlights the Arab overlordship in the region at the beginning of the 730s. So, since the Arab dominion was already consolidated, we should wonder why the Arabs would unleash a destructive attack against their subordinates in Kartli.

This can also be attested by looking into the obligations of a subordinate to their suzerain. It is known that the subordinates in the Caucasus were obliged to supply troops to the Caliphate.² Toumanoff is certain that the Presiding Prince of Kartli provided Marwān b. Muḥammad with troops for his campaigns against the Khazars.³ Even though Toumanoff does not base his hypothesis on the sources, the testimonies of Ibn A'tham al-Kūfī and Lewond are able to confirm it. According to the first, when Marwān b. Muḥammad arrived at Kisal, he summoned all *Armenian Lords* (*mulūk Armīniyah*) to fulfill their obligations by campaigning with him against the Khaganate.⁴ The ethnonym *Armenian* in the context of an Arabic source usually includes all the people in the administrative district of Armīniya, Armenians, Georgians, and Caucasian Albanians, which implies that Marwān b. Muḥammad summoned all his subordinates in the region.⁵ Lewond seems to confirm that the subordinates of the Caliph took part in these campaigns. In more detail, the Armenian historian writes that Marwān b. Muḥammad summoned the Armenian Ishkhan, Ashot Bagratuni, and his nakharars with their ca-

¹ Balādhūri, *The origins of the Islamic state*, p. 317. We can assume that the renewal took place in 730, before the entrance of the Arab armies into the city, in their way to operate against the Khazars. This must be the case, because al-Jarrah b. Abdallah was appointed governor in the Umayyad North in 729, which implies that he could not renew the treaty in 728. C.f. Blankinship, *The End of the Jihad State*, pp. 122-123. Blankinship dates the treaty to 724, proposing that the Arabs captured the city, imposing the *kharaj* on its people, in their campaign against the Alans. It should be noted that neither Balādhūri nor the other sources describing the Alan campaign of 724, mention an attack against the city of Tbilisi. Moreover, the terms of the renewed treaty and especially the clause about taxing point out that al-Jarrah wanted to reward the people of the city and keep them in the Arab sphere of influence during a period of struggle against the Khazars. This can relate to the city's strategic importance near the Darial Pass, one of the Arab points of entry in Alania and consequently to Khazars. For al-Jarrah b. Abdallah's governorship, see Khalīfa b. Khayyāt, *Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt's History*, p. 224.

² E.g., for this clause in the treaty of 654 in Tbilisi, see Balādhūri, *The origins of the Islamic state*, p. 316. For the Armenian parallel, see Laurent (rev. Canard M.), *L'Arménie entre Byzance et l'Islam depuis la conquête Arabe jusqu'en 886*, pp. 55-56.

³ Toumanoff, *Studies in Christian Caucasian History*, p. 405.

⁴ Ibn A'tham al-Kūfī, *Kitāb al-futūh*, p. 162.

⁵ We must note that the term Armīniya could also include territories outside of Caliphal borders. Ibn A'tham al-Kūfī writes that at the beginning of the campaign, Marwān b. Muḥammad *occupied every Armenian fortress* (see n. 30). In this case, these fortresses must refer to the regions of the North Caucasus and especially in Alania. This can be confirmed by looking into Khalīfa b. Khayyāt's testimony about the campaigns of 737 (see n. 15). The historian writes that Marwān b. Muḥammad roamed far into Armenia, namely into Alania and Khazaria. So, we propose that these *Armenian fortresses* should be identified with the three Alan fortresses that Marwān b. Muḥammad captured in 735 (see n. 13). C.f. Blankinship, *The End of the Jihad State*, p. 172, in which he states that these *Armenian fortresses* relate to Mamikonian castles.

valry to campaign on his side against the Khazars.¹ The Arab dominion in Kartli and Ashot's example lead us to accept that the Presiding Prince of Kartli also took part in Marwān's campaign. But who was this Presiding Prince?

Toumanoff, based on the *Royal Lists* of Georgia, identified the Prince with Guar-am III, the Younger.² Other scholars, based on the Ateni Inscription in Sioni, have proposed that the Chosroid Step'anoz should be considered in this position.³ However, we believe that the identification with Step'anoz cannot be the case. Firstly, he is considered an ally of the Byzantine Empire, as it seems that he received the title of Eristav of Egrisi by the Emperor.⁴ We can assume that the title of *eristav of eristavs of the Kartvels and the Megrels*, which appears in the inscription of Ateni, also derived from the Byzantine court and did not refer to the office that Step'anoz had during the Arab dominion of the country. Instead, it may refer to Step'anoz's claims in Georgia, claims that originated and were backed up by the Byzantines and their allies in the country, as an effort to counterbalance the Arabs. Therefore, the Arab administration would hesitate to recognize a Byzantine ally for the office of Presiding Prince of Kartvelians, especially in a region without a permanent military presence.⁵ So, it is most likely that the Arabs would bestow the office of Presiding Prince of Kartli in a pro-Arab house, instead of the Chosroids.

Given the fact that the Presiding Prince must have belonged to a pro-Arab faction and that Kartvelians helped Marwān b. Muḥammad in his struggle against the Khazars, we should rule out an Arab campaign against Kartli. Consequently, we must study the political situation in Egrisi to completely reject the possibility of an Arab attack in the region during Marwān b. Muḥammad's campaigns against the Khaganate. According to the sources, the Arab dominion in the region took place at the end of the seventh century. In particular, Theophanes testifies that Egrisi accepted Arab suzerainty in 697 when Patrician Sergius submitted to the Caliph.⁶ Moreover, he points out that in the first decade of the eighth century, Arabs had been recognized as suzerains of the

¹ Lewond Vardapet, *Discours Historique*, pp. 110-113.

² Toumanoff, *Studies in Christian Caucasian History*, pp. 404-405.

³ For the inscription, see აბრამიშვილი, სტეფანოზ მამფალის ფრესკული წარწერა [Abramishvili, *Mural Inscription of Stepanoz Mampal*], გვ. 68. For the identification with Step'anoz, see სანაძე, ბერაძე, *VIII საუკუნის I ნახევრის ქართლისა და ეგრისის პოლიტიკური ისტორიიდან* [Sanadze, Beradze, *On the Political History of Kartli and Egrisi in the First Half of the 8th Century*], გვ. 70-71.

⁴ სანაძე, ბერაძე, *VIII საუკუნის I ნახევრის ქართლისა და ეგრისის პოლიტიკური ისტორიიდან* [Sanadze, Beradze, *On the Political History of Kartli and Egrisi in the First Half of the 8th Century*], გვ. 70-71.

⁵ For their Armenian example, see Τακτιράκογλου, *Η Αρμενία μεταξύ Βυζαντίου και Χαλιφάτου*, pp. 119-123. We have no reason to doubt that the Presiding Prince of Kartli had the same responsibilities towards the Arab administration.

⁶ Theophanes, *Chronographia*, p. 370.

Abasgia, Egrisi and Kartli.¹ Later, the chronographer writes about the arrival of an Arab army in Tsikhe-goji, aiming to relieve the city from a Byzantine siege, an event that probably took place at the beginning of the 710s.² According to al-Ṭabarī, the next Arab attack in the area dates to 738/120, when Sulaymān b. Hishām campaigned against the Byzantines and captured Sindirah (Σιδηροῦν in the Greek sources), a fortress in Abasgia, something that Theophanes confirms.³

These events show that after the Arab subjugation of the region, Arabs campaigned in the western Caucasus either to protect their interests from the Byzantines or to attack military outposts occupied by the Empire. This suggests that Egrisi recognized Arab overlordship in the first half of the eighth century. Since there is no evidence in the sources pointing otherwise, we have no reason to doubt that during Marwān b. Muḥammad's governorship the situation had been altered.⁴ So, the Caliphal suzerainty over Egrisi is another testimony that leads us to reject that Marwān b. Muḥammad campaigned against Georgia.

Since this is the case, we should wonder why Pseudo-Juansher included Marwān b. Muḥammad in his text. According to some scholars, the text depicts real events, concerning the Arab attacks in Georgia, while others emphasize the issues of ideology and propaganda.⁵ In particular, Martin-Hisard considers that the text was prompted by a Chosroid environment to highlight their rights in the governorship of the country and their links with the Byzantine Empire.⁶

It is clear in the text that only the House of Chosroids and its alliance with the Empire would bring victory in the struggle against the Arabs. This can be attested in the Byzantine and Georgian retreat, which is interpreted as a part of a prophecy, according to which this retreat would be followed by their predominance in the future.⁷ In this context, the victory against Murvan Qru could work in the text as the validation of that prophecy and as proof that the House of Chosroids was chosen by the Divine Providence to liberate and then rule the country. Given the fact that Pseudo-Juansher wrote in a period when the House of Chosroids had fallen in decline, we can assume that his

¹ Theophanes, *Chronographia*, p. 391.

² Theophanes, *Chronographia*, p. 393.

³ al-Ṭabarī, *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, p. 167; Theophanes, *Chronographia*, p. 411.

⁴ We must note that Toumanoff's thesis that after 729 the Byzantines recaptured the whole region of Egrisi, because of the destruction of the Arab armies by the Khazars cannot be confirmed by the sources. See Toumanoff, *Studies in Christian Caucasian History*, p. 405 n. 52.

⁵ For the thesis about the historical accuracy of the text, see თავაძე, *საქართველო VIII საუკუნეში* [Tavadze, *Georgia in the Eight Century*], გვ. 118-126.

⁶ Martin-Hisard, *Les Arabes en Géorgie occidentale*, pp. 111-112.

⁷ Pseudo-Juansher, p. 110; Martin-Hisard, *Les Arabes en Géorgie occidentale*, pp. 110-111.

target was to propagandize their right to rule the country to his contemporaries at the beginning of the ninth century.¹

The importance of a victory against the Arabs that could work as a form of legalization against the other political parties in the county is highlighted by the study of the emperor's epistle to Archil, after the defeat of the Arabs, which Pseudo-Juansher allegedly saves. According to this, the emperor declared that *we [the Byzantines] will destroy the Agarians and all who have been raised by them will fall, while those who glorify us will rise.*² The Arab allies in this passage may be identified with the ruling House of Kartli that recognized the Arab suzerainty. It is evident that Pseudo-Juansher aimed to remind that the Pro-Arab Georgians would be destroyed inevitably when the Byzantines returned to the Caucasus and the Chosroids would be restored as the rulers of the country. Since Georgians did not actually defeat the Arabs during Marwān b. Muḥammad's time, Pseudo-Juansher had to create a narration to prove his point. Correctly, Martin-Hisard has stated that his target was not to write history but to praise the Chosroids, Mihr, and Archil.³

Pseudo-Juansher's target was to state that since Chosroids prevailed against the foreign invaders in the past, they will eventually rise against the political factions inside the country supporting them. In this context, we should discuss the introduction of Marwān b. Muḥammad in Pseudo-Juansher's text. His campaigns in the Caucasus were used as a background in his attempts to create a basis of legitimacy for the Chosroids. This may derive from Marwān b. Muḥammad's known military activity in the Caucasus. We have already mentioned that in Pseudo-Juansher's text, we may find information concerning various Arab operations in the area. According to Bíró, there are some events incorporated that can be traced to the so-called "Muddy Campaign".⁴ Pseudo-Juansher used the available information to create his narration and we can assume that Marwān b. Muḥammad's first campaigns against the Alans in 735/117 were employed for these propagandistic purposes. It seems that the information about the Arab army crossing Kartli to attack the Alans was transfigured by the historian in order to create a story about the Great Arab attack on Georgia and its repulsion by the Chosroids.

To summarise, we have shown that Marwān b. Muḥammad's campaigns in the Caucasus did not include Georgia, since geographical, chronological, and political pa-

¹ At this time the Kingdom of Abkhazia had been created, the Arab rule had been consolidated and the Bagratids had started to emerge. It is true that in this political landscape, the House of the Chosroids had been neglected. See Martin-Hisard, *Les Arabes en Géorgie occidentale*, p. 113.

² Pseudo-Juansher, p. 112.

³ Martin-Hisard, *Les Arabes en Géorgie occidentale*, p. 113.

⁴ For this campaign, see Khalīfa b. Khayyāt, *Khalifa ibn Khayyat's History*, p. 222 and for the information regarding it in Pseudo-Juansher's text, see Bíró, *Marwan ibn Muhammad's Georgian Campaign*, pp. 298-299.

rameters lead us to reject that the campaign happened at all. Marwān's priority was indeed in the Eastern Caucasus, against the Khazar Khaganate and its allies. Marwān b. Muḥammad was used as a role model for the creation of Murvan Qru because his campaigns in the area of the Eastern Caucasus had some impact on Kartli. Firstly, the Arab Armies used this region as one of their bases before the Khazar campaigns, while Kartvelians sided with Marwān b. Muḥammad in his military operations, as they were his subordinates. Since Marwān b. Muḥammad's Georgian Campaign is a fictitious creation of Pseudo-Juansher, Murvan Qru was used as a symbol of the destruction that the Arab administration – and mostly the pro-Arab Kartvelian Houses – managed in Georgia. Their pro-Arab stance was condemned by Pseudo-Juansher, since with their assistance towards the Caliphate, they became enemies of the Divine Province and as a result, incapable of running the country, a role that only the pro-Byzantines and glorified in the eyes of God Chosroids could assume. Finally, it is evident that the story of Murvan Qru had been constructed to revive the claims of the Chosroids, a House declining in the 9th century.

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**მურვან ყრუს ისტორიული სახის წარმოქმნაში
მარვან იბნ მუჰამადის როლის ახლებური შეფასებისათვის**

რეზიუმე

სტატიაში განხილულია ჰიპოთეზა, რომელიც ქართულ წყაროებში მოხსენიებული მურვან ყრუს ლაშქრობას, კავკასიაში მარვან იბნ მუჰამადის მიერ 735-740 წლებში განხორციელებული ლაშქრობებიდან ერთ-ერთად წარმოგვიდგენს. ამის საპირისპიროდ, მიგვაჩნია, რომ ეს ლაშქრობა ქართულ ისტორიულ წყაროებში ფიქციაა და მიზნად ისახავს ხოსროიდთა სახლის განდიდებას.

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ბ) არაბთა ბატონობა საქართველოში უკვე დამკვიდრებული იყო მარვან იბნ მუჰამადის ხაზართა სახაკანოს წინააღმდეგ ლაშქრობებამდე. აშკარაა, რომ VIII საუკუნის დასაწყისიდან ქართლმა უკვე აღიარა არაბთა სიუზერენობა, რაც დასტურდება, როგორც წერილობითი წყაროებით, ისე ნუმიზმატიკური მასალით. შედეგად, ჩვენ ვფიქრობთ, რომ ქართლის ხელმძღვანელი ერისმთავარი, რომელიც მიგვაჩნია პრო-არაბული დაჯგუფების წევრად ქართლში და არ ვაიგივებთ მას ხოსროიდ სტეფანოზთან, ეხმარებოდა მარვან იბნ მუჰამადს ხაზართა წინააღმდეგ ბრძოლაში.

გ) მარვან იბნ მუჰამადის მურვან ყრუდ ქცევა არის ხოსროიანების სასარგებლოდ წარმოებული პროპაგანდის შედეგი, რომელიც მიმართული იყო საქართველოში არსებული პროარაბული დაჯგუფებების წინააღმდეგ. ამის საფუძველზე, მარვან იბნ მუჰამადის დამარცხება ხოსროიანებთან შეიძლება აიხსნას, როგორც ფსევდო-ჯუანშერის მცდელობა დამტკიცოს, რომ ხოსროიანები ღვთის განგებით ქვეყნის გასათავისუფლებლად და სამართავად აირჩიეს.